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How Equitable is The Education Finance 
System in New York State? 
Introduction 
This policy brief provides an overview and evaluation of the 
education finance system in New York State. The brief addresses four
broad topics: student performance disparities in New York State, the 
nature of the New York State education finance system, the contributions 
of the New York foundation aid formula to educational equity, and the 
benefits to all taxpayers in New York State from education finance 
reform. 
Student Performance Disparities in New York State 
Every year, the New York State Education Department (NYSED) 
publishes a report describing student performance on the State’s 
achievement tests. These tests cover English Language Arts (ELA) and 
mathematics in the third through eighth grades. 
Table 1 describes the results from the most recent tests, which 
were taken in 2018.1 Almost one million students participated. This table 
shows the average proficiency rate on these tests for students in various 
categories. The tests are given a score of 1 to 4 and the proficiency rate is 
the share of students who receive a score of 3 or 4. 
This table reveals large disparities in student performance across 
various demographic groups. The disparity in the proficiency rates 
between White and Hispanic students is 17 percentage points on the 
ELA tests and 22 points on the math test. The comparable disparities 
between White and Black students are 18 and 25 percentage points, 
respectively. These are large gaps. The White ELA proficiency rate is 
1. The data cited here are available at: https://data.nysed.gov/ . 
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about 50 percent higher than the proficiency rate for Blacks or Hispanics 
and the gap is even larger than this on the math tests. New York State 
clearly is not providing an equal opportunity for all its students. 
To a large degree, these disparities reflect the challenges 
posed by poverty and immigration. Students who are not economically 
disadvantaged have a proficiency rate that is about 75 percent higher
than the rate for economically disadvantaged students. This gap is even 
larger when comparing students who are still learning English with other
students. 
Thanks to the racial and ethnic segregation across school districts 
in New York State, these disparities also appear in comparisons of school 
districts. To be specific, the available data make it possible to compare 
the proficiency rates (or average scores) in the schools attended by the 
average student in different demographic groups. For example, suppose 
there are only three types of schools, which have proficiency rates of 
75 percent, 50 percent, and 25 percent, respectively. Now suppose 
one-third of White students go to each type of school, whereas half of 
Black students attend schools where the proficiency rate is 50 percent 
and half attend schools where it is 25 percent. Then the school quality 
in the school attended by the average White student is [(1/3) × 75 + 
(1/3) × 50 + (1/3) × 25] = 50 percent proficient. In contrast, the school 
quality in the school attended by the average Black student is [(1/2) × 
50 + (1/2) × 25] = 37.5 percent proficient. Because, in this example, 
Black students do not have access to the best schools, the average Black 
student attends a school of much lower quality than does the average 
White student. 
A more general approach is to compare the share of the students 
in different ethnic groups who are in schools with overall proficiency rates 
below a certain level. Figure 1 provides this type of information for the 
overall proficiency rate (average share of students proficient on ELA and 















2014.2 This figure shows that half of Black students are in districts with 
overall proficiency rates below 20 percent, whereas only 8 percent of 
White students find themselves in districts where the proficiency rate is 
this low. Moreover, the median White student goes to school in a district 
where the proficiency rate is 35 percent. 
Additional evidence along these lines is provided in Figures 2 
through 5.3 Figures 2 and 4 show the cumulative distributions for eighth 
grade ELA and math proficiency rates in 2018. Figures 3 and 5 provide 
the same type of information for the average scores on these two tests. 
Figure 2 shows, for example, that the median Black student goes to a 
school where the eighth grade proficiency rate is 25 percent whereas the 
median White student goes to a school where this rate is 47 percent— 
almost twice as high. The comparable figures for the math tests (Figure 
4) are 11 percent and 25 percent, respectively. Figures 3 and 5 reveal 
that these disparities carry over to the average test scores, as well. In 
addition, the White-Hispanic gaps are almost as large as the White-Black 
gaps in all of these cases. 
These results reflect the balance between the high poverty 
rates and other factors that both raise the cost of education and lower
tax bases in districts where historically disadvantaged ethnic groups are 
concentrated and the extra state aid that these districts receive. They 
also demonstrate that the current balance leaves districts where these 
groups are concentrated at far lower levels of student proficiency than 
other districts, in large part because they do not receive enough aid from 
the state. 
According to the Court of Appeals, New York State is responsible 
for ensuring that every child receives the “opportunity for a meaningful 
high school education, one which prepares them to function productively 
2. These numbers and the surrounding text are taken from Yinger, John. 2015. 
“Unequal Access to Good Schools in New York State.” It’s Elementary column, 
April. Available at: https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/cpr/efap/It_s_Elementary/ . 






   
Education Finance Policy Brief 
as civic participants.” The courts have explicitly ruled that poverty and 
other factors that raise educational costs cannot be used as an excuse 
for failing to meet this standard. These results provide evidence that 
the State of New York is not living up to its educational responsibilities. 
Students cannot receive a “meaningful high school education” if they live 
in a district where only a small share of students attain proficiency in the 
tests leading up to ninth grade. The outcomes in Table 1 and Figures 1 
through 5 violate the standard set by the Court of Appeals and violate 
widely held principles of equal opportunity and fair treatment for children 
in different racial and ethnic groups. 
The New York State Education Finance System 
In 2017-18, the New York State education finance system 
provided the funding for 2,622,879 K-12 students in 733 school 
districts.4 This system has three main components: local property taxes, 
state aid to school districts, and STAR tax exemptions, which are paid 
either to school districts or to homeowners.5 Five school districts (New 
York City, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and Yonkers) are not independent 
but are instead departments of a city government. These school districts 
also have access to sales tax revenue, and in the case of New York City 
and Yonkers, income tax revenue. In 2019-20, state contributions to 
K-12 education will amount to almost $30 billion.6 
4. These figures come from http://data.nysed.gov. Some of these districts are 
small, specialized districts, so most of the data in this brief is based on about 100 
fewer districts. From this point on, this brief often shortens the year reference to 
the final year. For example, 2017-18 becomes 2018. 
5. State aid and STAR payments are funded by state general revenues, such as 

















How Fair Are the Pupil Weights in the NYS Foundation 
Formula? 
The recent history of state school aid in New York begins with 
the court finding in CFE v. New York (2003) that the amount of state aid 
to New York City was not sufficient to provide a “meaningful high school 
education.” 7 This ruling led to a 2006 ruling that the state should provide 
at least an additional $1.93 billion in operating aid to New York City per
year.8 Moreover, in 2007, elected officials passed a new education aid 
formula for the entire state that was designed to offset fiscal disparities 
across the state in line with the principles in the CFE ruling. A key 
feature of this new education aid formula was a new set of weights for
disadvantaged or “at-risk” students. 
To be more specific, New York, like most other states, uses a 
“foundation” formula for its main state education aid program. With this 
type of formula, state aid equals a foundation amount minus an expected 
local contribution. The foundation amount is the spending level state 
policy makers believe is required for a district to meet the state’s student 
performance standard. In New York, the foundation amount, called 
the Adjusted Foundation Amount or AFA, has several multiplicative 
components, including a phase-in percentage, a regional cost index, and 
a pupil need index, PNI. 
7. For more on this case and its legacy, see the It’s Elementary column, November 
2013. Available at https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/cpr/efap/It_s_Elementary/ , 
and the material posted at http://schoolfunding.info/. 








Emily Gutierrez and I recently conducted an analysis of the PNI.9 
This index indicates the percentage increase in educational costs in a 
given district associated with that district’s at-risk students. Many studies 
show that a district with a high concentration of at-risk students must 
spend more than other districts to achieve a given student-performance 
target.10 New York, like most other states, uses pupil weights to account 
for the extra costs of educating at-risk students. In the standard 
terminology for this type of aid formula, a weight of 1.0 for students from 
poor families leads to twice as much aid for these students as for non-
poor students, all else equal. Our analysis describes the pupil weights in 
New York State’s education aid formula, presents new weights estimated 
with recent data, and shows the extent to which the current pupil weights 
understate the cost differences implied by up-to-date estimates. 
As indicated above, these pupil weights appear in the PNI. 
Because it is a multiplicative component of the AFA, the PNI serves to 
increase aid per pupil in the neediest districts relative to the baseline 
established by the other components. A district’s value for this index 
depends on the share of the district’s students who are in poverty, the 
share of the district’s students who are English language learners (ELL), 
and the weights placed on these two district characteristics.11 
The poverty component combines two measures of poverty: 
9. Gutierrez, Emily and John Yinger. “Updated Pupil Weights for New York’s 
Foundation Aid Formula.” It’s Elementary Column, November 2017. Available 
at: https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/cpr/efap/It_s_Elementary/ . The material in 
the rest of this section draws heavily on this column. Ms. Gutierrez is a Ph.D. 
student in economics at Syracuse University. 
10. This principle is discussed in many of my It’s Elementary columns. See, for 
example, the column from October 2016 at: https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/ 
cpr/efap/It_s_Elementary/ . 
11. In a few small districts, the PNI also reflects the district’s sparsity. This is a 


















the three-year average share of students who are eligible for a free or
reduced-price lunch, FRPL, and the three-year average share of students 
from poor families as counted by the Census, SAIPE (for Small Area 
Income and Poverty Estimates).12 Each measure has a weight of 0.65. 
The weight for ELL students is 0.5. These weights are combined in the 
extraordinary needs component of the formula, EN 
EN = (0.65) × FRPL+ (0.65) × SAIPE + (0.5) × ELL 
The final PNI is (1 + EN) with a cap of 2.0. Suppose FRPL and 
SAIPE both equal 100% and ELL equals 10% in a given district. Then EN 
= (0.65)×(100%) + (0.65)×(100%) + (0.5)×(10%) = 1.35. Because 
of the cap, the final PNI is (1 + 1) = 2 instead of (1 + 1.35) = 2.35. As 
of 2015, no district had an EN value above 1, but several, including 
Rochester and Buffalo, had values above 0.95. Further increases in FRPL 
or SAIPE in these districts will push them above the cap, which means 
they will not receive full compensation for their added costs—even using 
the pupil weights in the current formula. 
The pupil weights in the current formula were informed by 
scholarly estimates of these weights available when the formula was 
designed. However, these weights have not been updated since then. We 
gathered the relevant data for approximately 612 K-12 school districts 
in New York State during the school years 2011-12 to 2014-15.13 
We estimated education cost functions using methods that are widely 
12. This information comes from the Census’ Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates (SAIPE) program which provides annual estimates of poor children, 
aged 5-17, by school district. 
13. Data sources include the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the American 
Community Survey, the New York Comptroller, the New York Department of 













recognized in the scholarly literature.14 These cost functions determine 
the extra spending associated with at-risk students holding student 
performance and other factors constant, which is the definition of a pupil 
weight. Our preferred estimates define student performance as an index 
that equally weights the share of students reaching the state’s proficiency 
standard on math and English exams in the third through eighth grades, 
as well as Regents Diploma rates. 
We find that the share of students eligible for a free lunch, FL, is 
the poverty measure with the strongest link to spending.15 The average 
district pupil weight for this measure is 1.25; that is, it costs 125 percent 
more to bring a poor student (by this measure) up to the same level of 
student performance as a non-poor student.16 Our estimated weights are 
0.61 for ELL students and 0.39 for students with a severe disability. This 
ELL weight is higher than the 0.5 weight in the current aid formula. 
By combining these weights with the share of students in each 
of these at-risk categories, we can also calculate the extra spending 
that is required to bring at-risk students up to any student performance 
14. For a review of this literature, see Duncombe, William D., Phuong Nguyen-
Hoang, and John Yinger. 2015. “Measurement of Cost Differentials.” In 
Handbook of Research in Education Finance and Policy, 2nd Edition, M.E. 
Goertz and H.F. Ladd (eds.), New York: Routledge, 260-278. For an earlier
application to New York, see Eom, Tae Ho, William D. Duncombe, Phuong 
Nguyen-Hoang, and John Yinger. 2014. “The Unintended Consequences of 
Property Tax Relief: New York State’s STAR Program.” Education Finance and 
Policy 9 (4) (Fall): 446-480. 
15. Scholarly estimates of pupil weights make use of pupil characteristics that 
best explain observed spending, controlling for other factors. We find that 
FL does a better job explaining the added costs of poor students than FRPL, 
SAIPE, or the combined measure in the current state aid formula. 















standard selected by New York State.17 We find that to attain any given 
student performance standard, state-wide school spending outside 
New York City has to increase by 37.1 percent to account for the state’s 
economically disadvantaged students, by 2.5 percent to account for
LEP students, and by 6.7 percent to account for students with severe 
disabilities. The required extra spending obviously varies across districts. 
Tables 2 and 3 indicate the percentage increase in spending required 
to cover, respectively, the added costs of free-lunch students and ELL 
students in the state’s 10 largest districts outside New York City. These 
added costs vary over time because the share of students in each of 
these categories varies. From 2014 to 2015, for example, many districts 
experienced an increase in the share of their students eligible for a free 
lunch and hence experienced an increase in their required added costs 
for this student category. See Table 2.18 
An alternative way to express these results appears in Figure 6, 
which describes funding gaps in high-poverty districts. More specifically, 
this figure indicates, for economically disadvantaged and ELL students 
combined, the gap in funding between an aid formula based on our
estimates and the current aid formula. This gap is expressed as a 
percentage of baseline spending. Figure 6 indicates, for example, that the 
state aid formula would have to give the Syracuse schools an additional 
16 percent of the state-wide baseline spending in 2015 to cover the 
added costs of economically disadvantaged and ELL students in the 
district. Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the overall added costs of free-
lunch and ELL students in Syracuse in 2015 are (90% + 9%) = 99% of 
17. Because of the multiplicative nature of New York State’s aid formula, we 
can express these results as a required percentage increase in spending. This 
percentage increase applies to any spending amount. 
18. For more information on recent poverty increases, see “Growing Student 
Poverty: Challenges for Achievement and State Aid,” by the New York 








the baseline, so this result indicates that the PNI in the current state aid 
formula covers (99% - 16%) = 83% of Syracuse’s spending need. 
This analysis leads to three key conclusions. First, the current aid 
formula in New York State makes a significant contribution to educational 
equity by accounting for the added costs of educating students in 
poverty and students who are English language learners. Second, despite 
this valuable contribution, the current formula does not provide many 
high-need districts with the funding necessary to fully offset their cost 
disadvantages. Third, thanks to growing poverty in many New York State 
school districts, the cap in the formula may soon begin to magnify the gap 
between actual and needed state aid in some high-need districts. 
These findings imply that the pupil weights in the current formula 
should be updated and the cap should be removed. The issues that need 
further examination include adding data for more recent school years, 
considering alternative definitions of school district performance, 
exploring additional measures of poverty, and exploring alternative 
ways to account for the added costs of students with special needs. An 
office in NYSED with responsibility for estimating these pupil weights, 
which does not currently exist, could provide additional insight into the 
range of issues raised by cost-function estimation and by changes in pupil 
characteristics over time. 
How Fair Is New York State’s Foundation Aid Formula 
Overall? 
Aid to New York City 
The 2006 CFE decision required New York State to pay at least 
$1.93 billion more in annual operating aid to New York City. Aid to New 
York City did increase in the years following the CFE decision, but this 
increase did not last very long. As shown in Figure 6, aid per pupil did 













   
  
   
 
 
per pupil in the rest of the state in those years.19 By 2010, however, it 
had dropped back down to the same level as the rest of the state and 
has been below that level ever since. Moreover, New York City’s share of 
total state aid has fallen far below its share of the state’s students, despite 
the temporary reversal of this situation right after the CFE decision. See 
Figure 7. 
At the time of the CFE ruling, 1,018,982 students attended
the City’s schools, so one could also say that CFE decision required the
state to increase its aid to New York City by $1.93 billion divided by
1,018,982 students, which equals $1,894.08 per pupil. To make this
figure comparable across years, it must be adjusted for inflation.20 
The most recent accessible data on aid to New York City applies to
the 2017 school year. The budget for this year is set in 2006—in 2006 
prices. Translated into 2006 prices, the $1,894.08 figure becomes
$2,382.70.21 In other words, the CFE decision called for an increase in 
aid to NYC in 2016-17 equal to $2,382.70 per pupil.22 With 1,018,982 
pupils, this requirement calls for $2.428 billion in state aid above the 
2007 baseline. In fact, however, state aid in 2017 was only $0.095 billion 
19. The data for Figures 6 and 7 can be found at: http://www.oms.nysed.gov/ 
faru/Analysis/cover.html . 
20. Comparing figures in 2006 dollars with figures in 2016 dollars is like 
comparing apples and oranges. An inflation adjustment is critical. Moreover, 
the 2006 CFE decision explicitly recognizes that the $1.93 figure “must be 
adjusted for inflation.” 
21. This calculation makes use of the consumer price index (available at: 
https://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables/supplemental-files/home.htm). The implicit 
price deflator for state and local government purchases (available at: https:// 
fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A829RD3Q086SBEA) is an alternative; it results in 
somewhat higher measures of aid shortfalls for NYC. 
22. The $1.93 billion comes from a calculation in which the level of school 
performance is fixed. One could also argue that the $1.93 billion should grow 
(in real terms) as the State’s school performance target grows. This approach is 
















about this baseline, leaving a gap of $2.428 billion – $0.095 billion = 
$2.333 billion. See Table 4. These calculations hold the number of pupils 
constant at the 2007 level. In fact, the number of pupils in New York City 
increased significantly over this period. As shown in Table 4, accounting 
for this increase raises the 2017 state aid gap to $2.574 billion.23 
Two further adjustments are needed to calculate the state aid 
shortfall in earlier years. First, the $1.93 billion was expected to phase in 
over four years. This adjustment leads to a required minimum aid increase 
perpupil of (1/4)×$2,382.70 = $595.67 in 2008, with a gradual increase 
up to the full $2,382.70 in 2011. Second, it seems reasonable to allow a 
lower aid increase in a recession year. The CFE decision did not mention 
this possibility, of course, but if the court had retained jurisdiction, it 
might well have allowed such an adjustment. State aid to districts outside 
New York City actually increased above the 2008 baseline in the first 
recession year, 2009, by 2.4 percent, but it decreased almost 4 percent 
relative to this baseline in 2010. Moreover, constant-dollar spending 
did not exceed this baseline until 2016. To place a lower bound on the 
remaining gaps in state aid, my calculations assume a considerably larger
reduction in the required minimum aid to New York City. To be specific, I 
reduce this minimum by 10 percent in 2009 and 25 percent in 2010, and 
then gradually return to the 2008 baseline with a 5 percent increase each 
year. 
The results of these calculations are presented in Table 4. After
the phase-in of the increased aid to New York City and the recession, 
state aid to the City falls more than $2.4 billion short of the CFE 
minimum in every year. The cumulative gap in actual aid compared to the 
required CFE minimum amounts to an astonishing $20.579 billion. Most 
of this gap reflects the failure of New York State to take the $1.93 billion 
23. I am by no means the first person to point out New York State’s failure to 
meet its CFE obligations. See, for example: Ashley, Stephanie D. 2017. “New 
York’s Persistent Denial of New York City Educational Rights: Ten Years After














requirement seriously, but $1.274 billion of it comes from the failure of 
New York State to account for the increased enrollment in New York City 
schools. In any case, these results demonstrate that the $1.93 billion aid 
increase in the CFE decision is nowhere in sight. Despite the CFE rulings, 
in other words, elected officials in New York State have returned to 
shortchanging school children in New York City. 
In several more years, New York City’s school aid may have 
increased enough in real terms so that the annual shortfalls disappear. 
Even in this case, however, the huge cumulative shortfall will remain 
unpaid. 
Aid Outside New York City 
The 2019-20 budget for New York State provides an increase 
in school aid of about $1 billion, bringing the total school aid up to 
$27.9 billion.24 Despite this increase, state school aid still falls short of 
the increase necessary to fully fund the foundation formula that was 
supposed to be phased in starting in 2008.25 Indeed, the Alliance for
Quality Education estimates that full funding requires an additional $4.1 
billion in state aid.26 
In another recent analysis, Emily Gutierrez and I asked whether
New York’s existing state aid system, including foundation aid and other
24. See: https://www.ny.gov/fy-2020-new-york-state-budget/highlights-fy-
2020-budget . 
25. Moreover, the state has been chipping away at local control over their
foundation aid by increasing the “set-aside” for community schools, and, in 
some districts, for magnet schools and teacher support. A foundation formula 
is intended to provide school districts with unrestricted funds. This set-aside 
transforms some of the foundation aid into a categorical grant that must be 
spent on a specific purpose—in this case on turning schools into community 
“hubs.” 
26. See https://www.aqeny.org/equity/. This estimate is dated November
2018, so the $618 million increase in foundation aid funding for 2020 brings 









    
 
 
   
  
aid programs, adequately recognizes the extra spending and revenue 
requirements of high-need districts.27 This analysis is an extension of our
examination of spending weights for at-risk students, which is discussed 
above. 
The analysis in this extension takes a broader view. To be
specific, we compare a district’s actual state education aid with a
comprehensive measure of its fiscal health. In this context, fiscal health
is defined as a district’s ability to deliver a given level of educational
quality at a given tax rate on its residents, based on factors outside
the district’s control. Our measure of fiscal health follows the logic of a 
foundation aid formula.28 It equals the amount a district must spend to 
meet the state’s student performance target (expenditure need) minus 
the amount of money the district can raise at a given level of sacrifice by 
its residents (revenue-raising capacity). 
Actual aid in these calculations includes current foundation aid, 
other school aid programs, and STAR reimbursements. We make no 
attempt to estimate the impact of specific provisions in the foundation 
aid program or in any other component of total state aid. These specific 
provisions include hold harmless rules, arbitrary limits in the foundation 
aid formula on the expected local contribution, negotiated school aid 
that supplements foundation aid, and the features of STAR (which are 
discussed below). Our calculations indicate whether the net impact of all 
these provisions is to pull certain types of districts away from the aid they 
27. This column, on which this section is based, is Gutierrez, Emily and John 
Yinger. 2018. “How Fair Is New York State’s Foundation Aid Formula?” It’s 
Elementary column, February. Available at:  https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/cpr/ 
efap/It_s_Elementary/ . 
28. Our fiscal health calculations and associated foundation aid formula follow 
the same philosophy as the New York foundation aid formula, but, as discussed 



















would receive under a foundation aid formula based on fiscal health. 
Our first step in calculating fiscal health is to determine each 
district’s relative costs. These costs include the higher costs of educating 
students from poor families, with limited English proficiency, or with 
special needs, which were the focus of our earlier analysis. They also 
reflect the higher wages that some districts must pay to attract teachers, 
holding teacher quality constant, and the economies or diseconomies of 
enrollment scale in each district.29 These cost factors are all determined 
from the estimation of an education cost function, as discussed in a 
previous section of this policy brief. The net effect of all these cost 
factors is summarized by a cost index, which equals 1.0 in the average 
district and, for example, 1.5 in a district where costs are 50% higher
than average. As discussed below, this cost index must be multiplied by a 
spending target in the average district to determine expenditure need. 
Our second step is to calculate the amount of money a district 
could raise using the principal local funding source for public education in 
New York, namely, the property tax. Because the property tax rate in the 
average district in New York is about 1.5 percent, we set the expected 
local contribution at this level. In other words, the revenue-raising 
capacity component of fiscal health is set at 1.5 percent of property 
wealth per pupil in each district. 
Our third step is to determine New York State’s implicit spending 
target in the average district, which is a component of expenditure need. 
Because our fiscal health measure is equivalent to a foundation aid 
formula, we can measure the required state budget for a fiscal-health-
based foundation formula at any given spending target. The State’s 
implicit spending target for the average-cost district is the one that leads 
to the same state education aid budget with our foundation formula as 
29. Costs per pupil are relatively high in very small districts. Some districts 
could lower these costs through consolidation. See Duncombe, William D. and 
John Yinger. 2010. “School District Consolidation: The Benefits and Costs.” The 
School Administrator 67 (5) (May): 10-17. We do not consider consolidation 





















the actual state aid budget in 2015. 
These steps lead to a measure of fiscal health equal to a district’s 
expected local contribution minus its expenditure need.  This need, also 
called the foundation amount, is defined as the state’s implicit spending 
target multiplied by the district’s cost index. The associated aid formula 
brings all districts into spending-revenue balance by setting aid equal 
to expenditure need minus the expected local contribution. To avoid 
“recapture,” defined as negative aid, the minimum aid amount is set at 
$1,000 per pupil. 
Figure 9 summarizes our results. This figure plots actual state aid 
(the vertical axis) and district fiscal health (the horizontal axis) for all 
districts in New York State except New York City.30 It shows that actual 
state aid in New York is correlated with district fiscal health. In other
words, districts in poor fiscal health tend to receive more state aid per
pupil than other districts. 
Nevertheless, three troubling lessons emerge from this figure.
First, state aid does not fully compensate low-health districts for their
disadvantages. To be specific, a $1 increase in the need-capacity gap
leads to only a $0.62 increase in state aid. Moreover, the expected gap
between fiscal-health-based aid and actual aid per capita is $5,488
higher in a school district with a 100 percent of its students eligible for
a free lunch than in a school district with no student poverty. 
Second, many large and/or high-need districts receive far less aid 
than warranted by their fiscal health. Actual aid falls short of fiscal-health 
based aid by $3,495 per pupil in Rochester, $4,930 per pupil in Syracuse, 
$6,612 per pupil in Binghamton, $7,924 per pupil in Schenectady, and 
an astonishing $13,214 per pupil in Yonkers. Buffalo is the only high-
need district that receives more actual aid, almost $2,000 per pupil, than 
aid based on fiscal health. 
Third, the districts that receive more aid than warranted by their
fiscal health alone are, on average, remarkably similar to the average 
30. In these calculations, “actual state aid” includes all the state aid a district 

















   
district overall. Their average enrollment is slightly smaller (2,160 
pupils compared to 2,403 pupils), their free lunch share is slightly lower
(33.3 percent compared to 38.3 percent), and their per-pupil wealth is 
virtually identical. The advantageous aid received by these districts, in 
other words, cannot be explained by factors related to their fiscal health. 
Overall, educational aid in New York State has an equalizing impact, but 
this impact falls far short of giving the neediest districts the aid they need 
to meet the state’s implicit student performance standards. 
Fiscal health is an appealing base for a state educational aid 
program because it summarizes a district’s fiscal situation based on factors 
outside its control. By offsetting each district’s fiscal disadvantages, an 
aid program based on fiscal health could play a major role in helping 
New York meet its constitutional requirement to ensure that all districts 
provide an adequate education. 
A focus on fiscal health provides further evidence that the New 
York State education aid system shortchanges districts with relatively 
high concentrations of Black and Hispanic students. To be specific, Figure 
10, shows that the median Black or Hispanic student goes to school in 
a district in which actual aid falls 19 percent below aid from a formula 
based on fiscal health. In contrast, the median White student goes to 
school in a district where actual aid exceeds fiscal-health-based aid by 
7 percent. The comparable figure for Asian students is 22 percent. The 
formulas that determine state aid in New York obviously do not include 
race or ethnicity directly, but this evidence shows that their net impact is 
to place Black and Hispanic students at a severe disadvantage. 
State policy makers may, of course, want to incorporate factors 
other than fiscal health into the foundation aid formula. Because fiscal 
health is such a fundamental measure of a district’s ability to deliver a 
quality education at a given sacrifice by its residents, I believe that any 
additional factors in the aid formula should have widespread support 











current aid formulas. 
The Role of STAR, the Property Tax Levy Limit, and the 
Local Taxing Requirement 
The education finance system in New York State also includes a 
tax-exemption program, a property tax limit, and tax contributions by 
the school districts themselves. The School Tax Relief Program, or STAR, 
gives homeowners with incomes below a certain amount an exemption 
on their school property tax payment. This exemption is adjusted to 
account for assessment procedures, so it is equivalent to an exemption 
on the value of their house. The state compensates a school district for
the revenue it loses because of this exemption. The STAR exemptions are 
gradually being turned into credits, in which taxpayers receive a check 
from the state instead of a break on their property tax payment.31 
All these STAR payments to school districts are appropriately 
counted as part of the state’s education finance system. In 2017, STAR 
cost the state $369 million in New York City and $2.415 billion in the 
rest of the state. Outside of New York City, the STAR reimbursements 
account for about 14 percent of aid from the state.32 
Property tax exemption generally make the property tax system 
more progressive among the set of people who receive them. In fact, 
exemptions eliminate the property tax altogether for homeowners 
whose houses have a lower value than the exemption. Nevertheless, the 
STAR exemptions have two features that make them inequitable. 
First, the STAR exemptions only apply to homeowners. As a 
result, the STAR payment  from the state is much larger for school districts 
with a high homeownership rate (often wealthy suburbs) than for school 
districts in which most households are renters (often cities). A high renter
population is correlated with high poverty and high student need, so the 
31. See: https://www.tax.ny.gov/star/ . Eligibility for STAR exemptions has a 
$500,000 income limit. 

















design of STAR does not send state money to the places that need help 
the most. Using $2.8 billion for STAR payments instead of for foundation 
aid undermines the equity of the state education finance system. 
Second, STAR exemptions are adjusted by an unfair “Sales Price 
Differential Factor” or SPDF. This provision, which costs state taxpayers 
$1 billion, increases the exemption in counties with above-average home 
sales prices.33 The 2019 STAR exemption in Westchester County, for
example, was $79,875, compared to $30,000 in most of upstate New 
York. Proponents of STAR have tried to argue that this is just a correction 
for the cost of living, but the truth is that tax systems do not—and should 
not—account for variation in the cost of living across locations. Markets 
already pay higher wages in locations with higher costs of living, and it 
makes no sense for governments to subsidize people for living in high-
cost locations. In short, the SPDF is profoundly unfair and should be 
removed from STAR. 
The property tax levy limit implemented in 2012 is another
source of inequity in the New York education finance system. School 
districts with a relatively high amount of state aid per pupil and/or a 
low property tax base per pupil tend to be poor districts and to have 
relatively low property tax revenue per pupil. As a result, the levy limit, 
which is roughly 2 percent per year, constrains these districts far more 
than it constrains other districts. 
33. Data on STAR payments can be found at: http://www.oms.nysed.gov/faru/ 



















In 2017, the last year with complete financial information, 10 
districts had a tax levy below $2,800 per pupil and 10 other districts 
had a tax levy above $37,750 per pupil.34 If a district starts with a per
pupil levy of $2,800, then the highest this levy can be after 20 years is 
$2,800×(1.02)20 = $4,161. In contrast, a district that starts with a per
pupil levy of $37,750, this levy could increase to $56,095 in 20 years. 
One of these poor districts has to wait at least 12 years to realize 
the same revenue increase per pupil as these rich districts obtain in a 
single year! Moreover, over a 20-year period, the gap in property tax 
revenue per pupil between these districts could grow from $34,950 
($37,750 - $2,800) to as much as $51,934 (= $56,095 - $4,161) per
pupil—and increase of $16,984 per pupil. In principle, of course, state 
aid could offset this dramatic disadvantage, but there is no sign that 
elected officials in New York State are even aware of this problem, let 
alone willing to fix it. 
As discussed above, foundation aid equals the spending required 
to meet a student performance target, called the foundation amount, 
minus an expected local contribution. To ensure fairness across districts 
with different wealth per pupil, this expected contribution is based on 
the same tax rate in every district. Of course, districts who receive this aid 
also make an actual contribution, that is, they collect money for schools 
through local taxes. In New York and about half of the other states that 
use a foundation aid formula, school district are not required to set their
actual contribution equal to their expected contribution, and many 
districts, especially poor ones, set their actual tax rate below the tax rate 
in the foundation aid formula. As a result, total funding for education in 
many districts falls short of the foundation amount, that is, of the amount 
that is thought to be needed to reach the State’s student-performance 
target. 















The only way to ensure that actual funding reaches the foundation 
amount, which is the cost-adjusted spending target, is to require school 
districts to levy a tax rate that equals or exceeds the implicit tax rate in 
the foundation aid formula. This inescapable logic leads to a dilemma for
state officials. The lower the expected tax rate, the higher the required 
state aid budget to reach a given foundation amount. However, raising 
the tax rate to minimize the state aid budget increases the burden on 
poor school districts. For example, the fiscal health calculations that 
lead to Figures 9 and 10 assume that the expected local property tax 
rate is 1.5 percent, which is roughly the average rate in the state. This 
rate is higher than the rate in many poor districts, however, so requiring 
a 1.5 percent rate would ensure that all districts had enough revenue to 
reach the foundation amount but would also place an additional burden 
on these poor districts. The only way to lower this burden is to raise the 
state foundation aid budget, which would make it possible to lower the 
expected tax rate and lower the number of poor districts that would be 
required to raise their actual rates. 
All New Yorkers Would Benefit from a Fairer School 
Aid Formula 
Elected officials in New York State should understand that all 
New Yorkers lose by the state’s failure to improve educational outcomes 
in low-income and minority school districts.35 To show why this is true,
consider first the recent study, authored by C. Kirabo Jackson, Rucker
C. Johnson, and Claudia Persico, which assembles a national data set
following individuals from childhood to adulthood, complete with
35. This section draws heavily on Yinger, John. 2016. “All New Yorkers Would 
Benefit from a Fairer School Aid Formula.” It’s Elementary column, September. 















information about their families and the schools they attended.36 This
study estimates how adult outcomes change when a child attends a
school in which school-finance reform, a type of external shock, led
to increased spending. The study is thorough and thoughtful and it is
published in a high-quality scholarly journal. 
The results are striking. The study’s (statistically significant) 
“estimate for children from low-income families indicates that increasing 
per pupil spending by 10% in all school-age years reduces the annual 
incidence of poverty in adulthood by 6.1 percentage points” (p. 203). 
Imagine that. A 10 percent permanent increase in spending (in real 
terms) would reduce the adult poverty rate for children from poor
families by about 6 percentage points. The study also finds that the adult 
income gains for students who experience from this type of education 
finance reform are roughly three times as large (in present value terms) 
as the added expenditures on education. This looks like a pretty good 
investment. 
Two other recent studies in top journals provide similar results. 
Julien Lafortune, Jesse Rothstein, and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach 
find that school finance reforms tend to increase spending in low-
income school districts and that these “reforms cause increases in the 
achievement of students in these districts, phasing in gradually over the 
years following the reform. The implied effect of school resources on 
36. Jackson, C. Kirabo, Rucker C. Johnson, and Claudia Persico. “The Effects 
of School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from 
School Finance Reforms.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 131 (1) (February 
2016): 157-218. The working-paper version of this study was discussed in my 







   
 
  




educational achievement is large.”37 Joshua Hyman finds that “students 
exposed to $1,000 (10 percent) more spending were 3 percentage 
points (7 percent) more likely to enroll in college and 2.3 percentage 
points (11 percent) more likely to earn a postsecondary degree.”38 
So why should taxpayers around the state care about this? The 
answer is that increased income for the grown-up children from poor
families saves state taxpayers a lot of money. 
The most obvious savings for taxpayers is a reduction in spending 
on social safety-net programs. According to a recent report, New York 
spends about $6.7 billion per year on federally mandated programs for
health insurance for low-income families (Medicaid/CHIP) and income 
support for low-income parents (TANF or Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families).39 Eligibility for these programs depend on household 
income,40 and this report shows that higher wages and employer provided 
health care [which may accompany better jobs at higher wages] would 
lower both state and federal public assistance costs, and allow all levels 
of government to better target how their tax dollars are used. 
The connection between household income and safety-net 
spending is well documented. The loss of income and jobs during the 
Great Recession pushed millions of families into Medicaid and added 
37. Lafortune, Julien, Jesse Rothstein, and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach. 
2018. “School Finance Reform and the Distribution of Student Achievement.” 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 10 (2): 1-26. 
38. Hyman, Joshua. 2017. “Does Money Matter in the Long Run? Effects of 
School Spending on Educational Attainment.” American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy 9 (4): 256-80. 
39. This report is Jacobs, Ken, Ian Perry, and Jenifer MacGillvary, “The High Public 
Cost of Low Wages.” U.C. Berkeley Labor Center. April 13, 2015. Available at: 
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/the-high-public-cost-of-low-wages/ . 
40. The role of income in eligibility for Medicaid is described at: https://www. 
medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/eligibility/ 








   
 
 
14.7 percent to Medicaid spending between 2007 and 2009.41 
Moreover, despite the time limits and work requirements associated with 
TANF, the number of TANF recipients increased significantly during the 
Great Recession. One study focuses on the years in which each state’s 
unemployment rate was rising and finds a 30 percent increase in the 
TANF caseloads, on average.42 Given New York State’s large safety-net 
budget, increases in income associated with education finance reform are 
likely to save the state’s taxpayers a great deal of money. 
Increases in income are also associated with reductions in crime 
and hence with lower costs for the criminal justice system. One study 
found, for example, that “a 50 percent increase in income reduces male 
arrests by 20 percent.”43 Reductions in crime associated with income 
increases also benefit taxpayers directly because they lower criminal 
victimization. 
Moreover, lower poverty and higher income in one generation 
lead to fewer children growing up in poverty in the next generation, which 
results, in turn, in higher school performance and lower future costs on 
state taxpayers. These cost savings to school districts are, of course, 
the flip side of the added costs from a concentration of students from 
poor families. As discussed above, the cost of providing a given level 
of student performance is higher in a district with a high concentration 
41. See “Medicaid Spending Growth and the Great Recession, 2007-2009.” 
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid Facts. February 2011. Available at: https:// 
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8157.pdf . 
42. Haskins, Ron, Vicky Albert, and Kimberly Howard. “The Responsiveness 
of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program during the Great 
Recession.” The Brookings Institution. August 2014. Available at: https://www. 
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/responsiveness_tanf_great_ 
recession_haskins.pdf . 
43. Heller, Sara B., Brian A. Jacob, and Jens Ludwig. 2011. “Family Income, 
Neighborhood Poverty, and Crime.” In Controlling Crime: Strategies and 
Tradeoffs, P. J. Cook, J. Ludwig, and J. McCrary (eds). Chicago: University of 


















of students from poor families than in district with low poverty. An 
equivalent statement is that lowering the concentration of students from 
poor families in a school district will allow the district to provide the same 
level of student performance at lower cost. 
The design of a school aid formula in New York is often seen as
a zero-sum game, with each district fighting for its share. This is a short-
sighted way to characterize the issue. All New Yorkers would gain from
more school spending in the state’s neediest districts, especially its big
cities. 
Conclusions 
The New York State education finance system takes some steps 
to minimize the disadvantages faced by students in school districts with 
high concentrations of poverty and of students who are still learning to 
speak English. Nevertheless, this system still exhibits inequality on many 
dimensions. 
The schools attended by Black and Hispanic students have 
significantly lower proficiency rates on ELL and math tests than the 
schools attended by White students. The State is responsible for this 
inequitable access to high-quality schools and should take steps to 
minimize this inequity. 
New York State’s foundation aid formula gives extra weight—and 
hence extra funding—to districts with high concentrations of “at-risk” 
students, defined as students from poor families or students who are 
English language learners. These weights are an improvement over the 
weights used in the aid formula before 2007, but they still understate 
the high costs of educating at-risk students and need to be updated. 
The inaccuracy of these weights leads to an aid program that leaves 
many high-need school districts short of the funds they need to meet the 
State’s student performance targets. The State should create an office 
that is responsible for regularly updating these weights. 
Elected officials in New York State have failed to provide the
















Moreover, New York State’s education aid programs overall
deviate from the aid that districts other than New York City would
receive based on their fiscal health, which is a measure of their ability
to deliver a high-quality education at a reasonable tax rate based on
factors outside their control. These deviations are particularly hard on
high-poverty school districts. In addition, these deviations result in a
system in which districts with high concentrations of Black or Hispanic
students tend to have less aid relative to their needs than do districts in
which the students are predominantly White. Deviations from a fiscal-
health-based foundation formula should be eliminated unless they
promote a clear, fair policy objective. 
In sum, the New York State education finance system takes
some steps to lower inequality in educational opportunity. However,
additional steps are needed to meet the principles in the CFE decision,
to eliminate funding inequities linked to race and ethnicity, and to




Table 1: Proficiency Rates, New York State, 2018 
3-8 ELA 3-8 Math 
Number of Percent Number of Percent 
Students Proficient Students Proficient 
Total 966,661 45% 931,449 45% 
Female 471,450 51% 450,977 45% 
Male 495,211 39% 480,472 44% 
Multiracial 23,156 48% 22,194 48% 
Native American 7,314 39% 7,031 36% 
Asian 107,652 67% 103,008 71% 
White 369,336 52% 350,520 54% 
Black 182,307 34% 175,579 29% 
Hispanic 276,896 35% 273,117 32% 
English Speaker 881,296 49% 836,316 48% 
English Language Learner 85,365 9% 95,133 16% 
Not Economically 
Disadvantaged 373,036 61% 352,468 62% 
Economically Disadvantaged 593,625 35% 578,981 34% 
 Source: https://data.nysed.gov/
27 
Table 2. Required Extra Funding for Free-Lunch Students in 
NYS’s 10 Largest Districts (Excluding NYC) 
School 







Brentwood 64% 81% 81% 88% 63% 17,266 
Buffalo 90% 95% 91% 96% 75% 30,986 
Greece 16% 39% 74% 80% 42% 11,092 
New Rochelle 50% 45% 45% 51% 38% 10,512 
Newburgh 70% 73% 30% 39% 42% 10,955 
Rochester 104% 100% 101% 105% 82% 28,958 
Sachem 13% 14% 20% 21% 14% 14,030 
Syracuse 91% 89% 90% 90% 72% 19,676 
Wappingers 36% 15% 15% 23% 18% 11,550 




Table 3. Required Extra Funding for ELL Students in 
NYS’s 10 Largest Districts (Excluding NYC) 
School 





Brentwood 17% 18% 19% 19% 29% 17,266 
Buffalo 7% 7% 8% 9% 13% 30,986 
Greece 1% 1% 8% 9% 8% 11,092 
New Rochelle 6% 6% 6% 6% 10% 10,512 
Newburgh 9% 9% 2% 2% 9% 10,955 
Rochester 7% 7% 7% 8% 12% 28,958 
Sachem 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 14,030 
Syracuse 8% 9% 9% 9% 14% 19,676 
Wappingers 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 11,550 
Yonkers 7% 7% 7% 7% 12% 24,357 
  
  
Table 4. Shortfalls in Reaching CFE Spending Minima 
for NYC (in billions of 2016 dollars) 
Shortfall Due to 
Shortfall Based on Increase in Pupils, 
Year 2006-07 Pupil Count 2007-2017 Total Shortfall 
2017 $2.333 $0.241 $2.574 
2016 $2.195 $0.217 $2.412 
2015 $2.816 $0.247 $3.063 
2014 $2.701 $0.170 $2.871 
2013 $3.075 $0.153 $3.228 
2012 $2.898 $0.128 $3.027 
2011 $2.323 $0.087 $2.410 
2010 $1.284 $0.034 $1.318 
2009 -$0.146 -$0.001 -$0.148 
2008 -$0.175 -$0.001 -$0.175 
Cumulative $19.305 $1.274 $20.579 
Shortfall = CFE required minimum aid increase minus actual aid above 2006-07 
level. The CFE minimum is phased in from 2008 to 2011. In addition, the CFE
minimum is reduced in recession years (by 10% in 2009 and 25% in 2010 and 
then phased back it at 5 percentage points per year). Corrections for inflation 
use the CPI. 
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